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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
AVOIDABLE LIENS.  In a divorce decree, the debtor
was awarded possession of the marital residence until the
children had reached majority or had moved out.  Under the
divorce decree, the debtor's spouse's parents held two liens
against the property which entitled them to the proceeds of
the sale of the house, up to the amount of the liens, after
the debtor's possession right terminated.  The debtor sought
to avoid the parent's liens as impairing the debtor's
homestead exemption.  The court held that the liens could
not be avoided  as judicial liens because under state law the
equitable distribution of property in a divorce proceeding
was a "special declaration of statute" and not a judicial lien.
In addition, the liens could not be avoided because the
exemption was impaired by the divorce decree and not the
liens. In re Reinders, 138 B.R. 937 (Bankr. N . D .
Iowa 1992).
DISMISSAL.  The debtor corporation was established
by an individual who had filed for personal Chapter 11
bankruptcy involving a ranch business.  The creditors had
obtained relief from the automatic stay and the individual's
attempts to stay foreclosures during appeals failed. In an
attempt to further forestall the foreclosures, the individual
established the debtor corporation in another state and
transferred the ranch assets to the corporation, although the
court in the individual's bankruptcy case had ordered the
individual not to transfer the assets.  The court held that the
debtor corporation's case be dismissed for bad faith filing
because of the serial filing by the ranch business, the
transfer of assets in violation of the bankruptcy court order
and the continued unlikelihood that the debtor corporation
could successfully reorganize. In re  Coones Ranch,
Inc., 138 B.R. 251 (Bankr. S.D. 1991).
EXEMPTIONS.
ANNUITY.  The debtor purchased an annuity in July
1988 but made the commencement date of payments after
the filing for bankruptcy. The court held that because no
conditions remained, except passage of time, for payment of
the annuity, the annuity matured on the date of purchase and
not the date of the first payment.  The annuity was not
eligible for an exemption because the payments were not
reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor. In re
Moffat, 959 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1992), aff'g,
119 B.R. 201 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990).
IRA.  The debtor claimed an interest in an IRA as
exempt under 31 Okla. Stat. § 1(A)(20).  The bankruptcy
court held that the statute was unconstitutional as impairing
existing contracts.  The appellate courts held that the
exemption was constitutional because the exemption was
reasonable and narrowly tailored to accomplish a specific
purpose.  The courts also held that the exemption was not
pre-empted by ERISA.  In re  Walker, 959 F.2d 8 9 4
(10th Cir. 1992), aff'g , 139 B.R. 31 ( N . D .
Okla. 1990), rev'g , 108 B.R. 769 (Bankr. N . D .
Okla. 1989).
PENSION PLAN.  The debtor claimed an interest in an
ERISA qualified pension plan as exempt.  The debtor had
terminated employment and had the power to require
distribution from the plan at any time.  The court held that
the debtor's interest in the plan was not excludible from the
bankruptcy estate because the plan no longer qualified as a
spendthrift trust under state law. In re  Reid, 139 B . R .
19 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1992).
PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS.  The debtor listed as
exempt, under Minn. Stat. § 550.37, the debtor's interest in
a personal injury claim.  The court held that the exemption
statute was unconstitutional as to special damages accruing
before the personal injury petition in that the statute set no
limit on the exemption.  The court also held that the
exemption did not apply to punitive damages.  The court
allowed the exemption as to the personal injury claim as to
general damages. In re Cook, 138 B.R. 943 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 1992).
FEES .  The debtor filed for bankruptcy through a
bankruptcy service which provided forms and general
assistance in filling out the forms.  The court held that the
service was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and
would be required to return to the bankruptcy estate all fees
paid by the debtor. In re  Herren, 138 B.R. 9 8 9
(Bankr. D. Wyo. 1992).
  CHAPTER 11  
PLAN MODIFICATION.  Part of the debtor's
confirmed Chapter 11 plan was an agreement with a secured
creditor for payment of the secured claim over 25 years.  The
debtor made the initial lump sum payment and the first
annual installment but filed for modification of the payment
terms after the second annual payment was missed.  The
modification sought to decrease the principal to the current
fair market value of the property and added amortization of
the amount in default under the plan.  The court denied the
modification because the plan was otherwise substantially
consummated and the original plan terms were obtained by
agreement of the debtor and creditor. In re  Stevenson,
138 B.R. 964 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1992).
  CHAPTER 12  
CONVERSION.  The debtors had filed a Chapter 12
case and obtained confirmation of their plan which provided
for payment of an amount of cash from the sale of crops to
the trustee for distribution to creditors.  The proceeds from
the crops were insufficient to fund this portion of the plan
and the debtors converted the case to Chapter 7.  The debtors
claimed a portion of the proceeds as exempt property.  The
trustee argued that the proceeds vested in the creditors in the
Chapter 12 case and could not be claimed as exempt.  The
court held that the interests of the Chapter 12 creditors did
not vest in the proceeds until the creditors were paid and that
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upon conversion the proceeds became part of the Chapter 7
estate, subject to the debtors' exemption rights. In re
Plata, 958 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1992).
  FEDERAL TAXATION  
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES .  The IRS filed
an administrative expense claim for taxes incurred by the
debtor post-petition.  The court held that the taxes incurred
post-petition but pre-confirmation were allowed as an
administrative expense; however, taxes incurred post-
confirmation were the personal liability of the debtor and
not an administrative expense of the bankruptcy estate.
Fullmer v. U.S., 92-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,237 (10th Cir. 1992).
ALLOCATION OF PLAN PAYMENTS FOR
TAXES .  The Chapter 11 debtor sought allocation of
payments for tax claims to pre-petition taxes before
application to post-petition taxes.  The court joined the
Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits in holding that Chapter 11
plan payments of taxes were involuntary and not required to
be allocated as the debtor requested. Fullmer v. U . S . ,
92-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,237 (10th Cir .
1992) .
AUTOMATIC STAY .  The IRS had levied against
the debtor's interests in two IRA's and one week later the
debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.  The debtor sought to
stop the IRS from further action against the accounts but
the IRS completed the levy and seized the amounts in the
accounts.  The debtor sought recovery of the amounts taken
and sanctions for violation of the automatic stay.  The court
held that because the levy was against cash or cash
equivalents, the notice of levy transferred ownership
immediately to the IRS, and therefore, the IRA's never
became estate property subject to the automatic stay.
McLaughlin v. I.R.S., 139 B.R. 9 (N.D. Ohio
1991) .
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS .  Although this case
involved primarily an issue of class action, the underlying
action identifies a current issue of avoidable transfers.  The
debtor had employed a tax return preparer to prepare federal
income tax returns.  Because the debtor was entitled to a
refund, the preparer helped the debtor obtain an "instant
refund" through a loan with a bank, under which the bank
would receive direct payment from the IRS when the refund
was issued.  The trustee sought avoidance of the payment of
the refund to the bank within 90 days before the debtor filed
for bankruptcy as a preferential transfer or improper setoff.
This issue was not ruled upon in this case but should give
fair warning to creditors who participate in such programs
that the IRS refund may not be secure.  In re  Weisbrod,
138 B.R. 869 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992).
DISCHARGE.  The debtors sought discharge of their
1986 federal income taxes which were filed in September
1987.  The IRS argued that an extension to file had been
granted, extending the filing date to August 1987, within
three years of the debtors' bankruptcy filing.  The debtors
argued that the extension was void because the extension
application did not make a reasonable estimation of the
taxes due.  The court held that the extension was timely
made and not denied by the IRS and, therefore, was effective
to extend the filing date to within three years of the
bankruptcy filing, making the taxes nondischargeable. In re
Gidley, 138 B.R. 289 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992).
The debtor had obtained a judgment that a late filed claim
of the IRS was disallowed; however, the IRS sent the debtor
an assessment notice for the taxes involved in the disallowed
claim during the appeals of the disallowance ruling.  The
IRS, however, told the debtor that it would not attempt any
enforcement of the assessment until the appeal was settled.
The court held that the assessment violated the discharge
injunction of Section 524(a) but that the assessment would
be allowed to stand because no harm was done to the debtor.
In re  Norris Grain Co., 138 B.R. 1004 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1992).
NET OPERATING LOSSES .  In a case under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the court held that the debtor's pre-
bankruptcy net operating losses could not be used by the
bankruptcy estate in filing its federal income tax return. In
re  Luster, 138 B.R. 875 (N.D. Ill. 1992), rev'g ,
134 B.R. 632 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991).
In a case under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the court
held that the debtor's pre-bankruptcy net operating losses
could not be used by the bankruptcy estate in filing its
federal income tax return.  The court also held that post-
petition federal income taxes received first priority as
administrative costs. In re Friedman, 138 B.R. 8 8 1
(N.D. Ill. 1992), rev'g , 134 B.R. 632 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1991).
TAX LIENS.  In 1989, the IRS filed a notice of tax
lien for federal taxes owed by the debtor.  The debtor argued
that, under I.R.C. § 6323, the lien did not attach to the
debtor's interest in an employee stock option plan because
the plan was a security and the bankruptcy trustee took
possession of the interest as a good faith purchaser.  The
court held that the stock option plan was not a security and
the trustee was not a good faith purchaser because the trustee
paid no consideration for the estate's acquisition of the
debtor's interest in the plan. In re  McNitt, 139 B . R .
21 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1992).
CONTRACTS
EXCUSED PERFORMANCE.  The plaintiff was a
commodities broker who entered into a contract to buy corn
from a producer, the defendant.  The corn was to be delivered
to a customer of the plaintiff; however, the defendant was
unable to make timely delivery because the buyer had no
storage.  When the buyer had storage again, the producer no
longer had any corn and the plaintiff sued for the cost of
replacement corn.  The court held that the defendant's
performance was excused by the actions of the buyer in
refusing timely delivery offers.  The plaintiff had also
entered into a contract to purchase corn flour from the
defendant but cancelled the contract after the plaintiff's buyer
refused most of the flour.  The defendant told the plaintiff
that another buyer would be sought and sued the plaintiff for
the difference in the sale price obtained from a subsequent
buyer.  The court held that the plaintiff had sufficient notice
of the resale to another buyer. Eades Commodities,
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MARKETING ORDERS .  The plaintiffs were
handlers of navel oranges who challenged the weekly
announcement of the limit on the quantity of navel oranges
which could be shipped.  The plaintiffs argued that the
procedure did not comply with the Administrative
Procedures Act notice and comment requirements.  The court
upheld the procedure because the annual order setting the
general weekly restrictions did comply with the notice and
comment requirements and the weekly recommendations of
the Navel Orange Administrative Committee were reached
after public hearings.  The USDA's use of the NOAC's
recommendation was not arbitrary or capricious because the
USDA had the power to not use the recommendations.
Riverbend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d
1479 (9th Cir. 1992).
PACA .  The bankruptcy debtor had purchased produce
from the creditor and the creditor sought relief from the
automatic stay to recover the purchase price from the PACA
trust fund.  The parties had agreed in writing to payment
within 30 days after invoice, which was greater than the 10
day payment provision of PACA, but the creditor failed to
include the extended payment term on the invoices as
required by PACA.  The court held that the clear failure to
comply with the statutory requirement that the extended
payment terms be listed on the invoices caused the creditor
to lose any rights in the PACA trust fund. In re  San
Joaquin Food Service, Inc., 958 F.2d 938 (9th
Cir. 1992).
PAYMENT LIMITATIONS. The plaintiffs operated
a family farm corporation which farmed land owned by the
corporation and land leased to the corporation.  In 1984, the
corporation and plaintiffs were determined to be one
"person" for payment limitation purposes.  The plaintiffs
transferred 50 percent of the corporation to their two
daughters, individually farmed the leased acres and leased
equipment from the corporation.  The plaintiffs sought a
determination that they were eligible as four "persons" for
payment limitation purposes but were rejected through
appeals to DASCO.  Although the plaintiffs focused their
arguments against the ASCS handbook standards, the court
held that under the regulations, the plaintiffs had not made
any substantive change in the farming operation to warrant
an increase in the number of "persons" eligible for
payments. The court also held that the handbooks were
interpretative in nature and not subject to the notice
requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act.
Schultz v. U.S., 25 Cls. Ct. 384 (1992).
The plaintiffs were three brothers who had formed a farm
partnership and who were shareholders in a farm corporation.
During 1987 the partnership paid some of the corporation's
labor costs and the three brothers transferred equipment to
the corporation which was not paid for by the corporation
for several months.  The ASCS determined that the
brothers, the partnership and corporation were only one
"person" for payment limitation purposes.  The court upheld
the determination because (1) the corporation received
financial assistance (labor costs and equipment use) from
another entity, (2) the loan of money and equipment to the
corporation was not a family loan because the corporation
was not related to the shareholders, and (3) the regulations
provided no exception for insignificant amounts of
financing.  Bar 9 Farms, Inc. v. U.S., 25 Cls. C t .
392 (1992).
PESTICIDES.  The plaintiff purchased property
which was owned by a wood treatment facility which used a
pentachlorophenol product.  When an employee of the
plaintiff became ill with pentachlorophenol poisoning, the
plaintiff sued the chemical manufacturer for negligence and
strict liability for failure to warn.  The manufacturer argued
that the state court action was prevented by preemption of
FIFRA.  Although noting a split of authority on the issue,
the court held that FIFRA's labeling requirements impliedly
preempt a state law negligence action for failure to warn.
Arkansas-Platte & Gulf v. Van Waters &
Rogers, 959 F.2d 158 (10th Cir. 1992), rev'g,
748 F.Supp. 1474 (D. Colo. 1990).
The plaintiff sued the manufacturer of a pesticide for
injury to the plaintiff's soybean crop.  The plaintiff based
the claims on negligence in failure to warn and breach of
express warranties and implied warranties of merchantability
and fitness for purpose.  The defendant argued that FIFRA
labeling requirements preempt any state court action for
failure to warn.  The court agreed.  The defendant also argued
that the warranties were disclaimed on the labels.  The court
held that the effectiveness of the disclaimers involved factual
questions to be resolved by the trier of fact and denied
summary judgment for the defendant on the warranty issues.
Young v. American Cyanamid Co., 786 F .
Supp. 781 (E.D. Ark. 1991).
PRICE SUPPORT LOANS .  The plaintiffs were
corn producers who had obtained several CCC price support
loans with their grain as collateral.  The grain was stored at
several locations, including several bins leased by the
plaintiffs.  The ASCS inspectors made several inspections
of the stored grain and although the grain was rated
"satisfactory," the inspectors noted problems with mold,
water damage and weevil infestation.  The county committee
requested that the plaintiffs either rotate the stored corn or
otherwise improve the storage and submit written lease
extensions to demonstrate that the plaintiffs would have
sufficient storage for the collateral corn.  When the rotation
and leases were not forthcoming, the county ASCS called
all of the loans and required delivery of the grain or payment
of the loans.  The court held that the actions of the ASCS
were not arbitrary and were within ASCS authority to
protect the corn collateral. The court also found that the
ASCS acted with due process, although several decisions did
not notify the plaintiff of appeal rights, in that the plaintiff
did appeal most decisions and had ample opportunity to
obtain explanations and bases for the ASCS decisions.  The
court ruled that the calling of the loans was not an
unconstitutional taking in that the transactions were
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proprietary and not sovereign acts of a governmental agency.
Gratz v. U.S., 25 Cls. Ct. 411 (1992).
SEASONAL AGRICULTURAL LABOR.  The
plaintiffs were seasonal agricultural workers hired by an
unregistered labor contractor who was hired by the defendant
to obtain laborers for use in the defendant's labor contracting
business.  The contractor paid the plaintiffs wages and
withheld employment taxes but failed to pay the withheld
taxes to the IRS.  The contractor also failed to maintain
adequate work records and wage statements and to file W-2
forms.  The plaintiffs were injured while riding in a van
owned by the contractor on their way to a potential work
site but the van was not covered by auto insurance.  The
defendant was cited for several violations of the Migrant and
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act.  The defendant
argued that the act did not apply because the plaintiffs were
hired by the contractor.  The court held that the definition of
"employ" for purposes of MSAWPA includes persons who
assign employment duties to third party contractors.  The
court held that the defendant had violated the registration
verification requirements by not requiring the contractor to
be registered; the recordkeeping requirements because the
contractor did not maintain wage and hour records; the wage
statement requirement because the contractor did not provide
wage statements with the wages paid; and the vehicle
insurance requirement. Saintida v. Tyre, 783 F.Supp.
1368 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
MARITAL DEDUCTION.  The decedent's will
bequeathed all property to the surviving spouse in trust with
the daughter as trustee.  The property was held in two funds.
The trustee had the power to distribute property of one fund
to the daughter with the consent of the spouse.  The court
held that the property in that fund was not eligible for the
marital deduction as QTIP because trust property could be
appointed to someone other than the surviving spouse. Est.
of Manscill v. Comm'r, 98 T.C. No. 30 (1992).
The decedent's estate included an interest in an IRA of
which a marital trust was the designated beneficiary.  The
IRA trust agreement provided three options for payouts from
the IRA, none of which required all income of the IRA to be
paid at least annually to the beneficiary.  The marital trustee
selected one of the payout options but directed that the IRA
distribute all income at least annually.  The IRS held that
the IRA funds in the marital trust were not eligible for
QTIP because none of the payout options required at least
annual payments of all income.  The trustee's amendment to
the payout election was not sufficient to remedy the defect
because the property must meet the QTIP requirements at
the time it passes from the decedent to the trust. Ltr. R u l .
9220007, Jan. 30, 1992.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION.  The decedent's
estate included a majority interest of voting preferred stock
in a family ranch corporation.  The decedent made all
management decisions in the operation of the ranch and had
transferred shares in the corporation to children and
grandchildren such that, at the date of death, the other family
members owned all of the voting common stock and a
minority of the voting preferred stock.  The preferred stock
holders were entitled to redeem their shares at par value plus
unpaid dividends; the common stock had no par value and
was entitled to be redeemed only after the preferred stock.
The estate elected the special use valuation method and
valued the decedent's preferred stock by first determining the
percentage of value of the stock to all stock and then
allocating that percentage to the special use value of the
ranch land.  The IRS ruled that the special use value of the
corporation must first be determined which would then
determine how much each preferred share would receive on
redemption in liquidation.  The value of the decedent's
preferred shares for special use valuation purposes would
then equal the amount for each share times the number of
shares held by the decedent.  Therefore, if the special use
valuation was less than the amount entitled to be received
by the preferred shares, no value would be allocated to the
common stock.  The IRS noted that the voting control of
the decedent would not add any premium to the decedent's
shares. The IRS cited to Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237
and Rev. Rul. 83-120, 1983-2 C.B. 170 for rulings on
valuation of preferred stock. Ltr. Rul. 9220006, Jan
29, 1992.
    TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS.
Within three years of the decedent's death and when the
decedent was in remission from cancer, the decedent
transferred the residence to a sole heir in exchange for a
mortgage, less $20,000 as a gift.  The sale contract allowed
the decedent to live in the house for rent equal to the interest
payments on the mortgage. In the penultimate and last years
of the decedent's life, another $20,000 of mortgage was
forgiven each year.  The decedent's will also caused the
remaining amount on the mortgage to be forgiven.  The
court held that the substance of the transaction was only an
attempt to avoid tax and included the entire value of the
residence in the decedent's estate. Est. of Maxwell v .
Comm'r, 98 T.C. No. 39 (1992).
TRUSTS .  An irrevocable trust was established for
each of five children of the grantors.  The beneficiaries were
entitled to at least quarterly payments of trust income and
the trustee had the power to invade corpus for the support,
maintenance and education of the beneficiary if income was
insufficient.  Upon reaching age 40, a beneficiary could
withdraw all corpus from the trust.  The beneficiaries
obtained a court ordered agreement with the trustee
eliminating the beneficiaries' power to invade corpus after
reaching age 40, but two of the beneficiaries reached age 40
before the agreement was approved.  The IRS ruled that gain
or loss from the sale of trust assets prior to the agreement
and after the two beneficiaries reached age 40 was reportable
by the beneficiaries who had reached age 40.  After the
agreement, the gains or losses were reportable by the trust
as to all beneficiaries. Ltr. Rul. 9220012, Feb. 7 ,
1992 .
VALUATION.  The decedent was an artist with over
400 art pieces in the gross estate.  The artwork was divided
by the court into two groups based on the ability of the
estate to sell the pieces relatively quickly or slowly at near
fair market value.  The first group was discounted 25 percent
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CAPITAL ASSETS. The taxpayers were partners in
a partnership which purchased land and held the land for
three years before selling the land to a related entity for
development of a shopping center.  The court held that the
gain from the sale was taxable as capital gain because the
partnership was not in the business of buying and selling
land but held the land as a means of investment.
Bramblett v. Comm'r, 92-1 U.S. Tax Cas .
(CCH) ¶ 50,252 (5th Cir. 1992), rev'g , T . C .
Memo. 1990-296.
C CORPORATIONS
CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS.  The taxpayer
contributed funds to a corporation owned by the taxpayer's
brother-in-law and claimed the contribution as a bad debt
deduction upon termination of the corporation.  The court
held that the contribution was a capital contribution and not
a loan because no loan agreement was executed, no collateral
was obtained for the loan amount, and the taxpayer received
a share in the corporation in exchange for the contribution.
Greenberg v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1992-292.
DEDUCTIONS.  The taxpayers were not allowed loss
deductions incurred as part of a purchase and leaseback of a
motor home to a dealer because the transaction lacked any
profit motive or expectation. Johnson v. Comm'r,
T.C. Memo. 1992-288.
DEPLETION. The taxpayer was the surviving spouse
who owned, as community property, interests in oil and gas
properties.  The decedent spouse died on March 18, 1989 and
the surviving spouse filed a joint 1989 tax return for the
decedent's short taxable year and the surviving spouse's full
taxable year.  The IRS ruled that the decedent's return would
include the depletion amount for the short taxable year based
upon the decedent's basis in the decedent's one-half
community property interest and the surviving spouse
would determine the depletion allowance based upon the
surviving spouse's basis in the entire property as of
December 31, 1989.  The surviving spouse's basis in the
property would include the fair market value of the
decedent's interest of the property as determined for estate tax
purposes. Rev. Rul. 92-37, I.R.B. 1992-21, 5.
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS.  The IRS has revoked
Notice 89-45, 1989-1 C.B. 684 as to the application of the
10-year phase-in rules of I.R.C. § 415(b)(5) as to the
limitations on annual benefits which may be paid or accrued
under qualified benefit plans for employees with 10 or fewer
years of participation.  The new rule does not require
separate application of the limitation for each change after
August 3, 1992.  Employers may elect to retroactively
apply the rule. Rev. Proc. 92-42. I.R.B. 1992-22 ,
12 .
The IRS has issued a proposed revenue procedure
providing simplified procedures for the data collection and
testing for substantiation of compliance with
nondiscrimination rules. Ann. 92-81, I.R.B. 1992-
22, 10.
The IRS has issued simplified procedures for amending
master and prototype, regional prototype and volume
submitter plans to take advantage of the liberalized rules in
final regulations under I.R.C. §§ 401(k), (m) and the new
definition of of compensation under I.R.C. § 414(s) and
Treas. Reg. § 1.415-2(d)(11)(i). Rev. Proc. 92 -41 ,
I.R.B. 1992-21, 23.
HEALTH INSURANCE .  A reminder that the
deduction from gross income for self-employed persons of
25 percent of the cost of health insurance is due to expire
June 30, 1992, unless extended by passage of introduced
legislation.
INSTALLMENT REPORTING.  The taxpayers
claimed an interest expense deduction from the installment
sale of a condominium.  The taxpayers claimed that the sale
was completed in June 1983 but the evidence showed that
the buyers did not have the benefits and burdens of
ownership  in June 1983. The court held that the interest
deduction was not allowed under I.R.C. § 483 because the
first installment, paid in December 1983 was not received
more than six months after the sale. Williams v .
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1992-269.
IRA'S.  The IRS has ruled that individual retirement
arrangement trusts, custodial account agreements and
annuity contracts must be amended to provide for the
required distributions rule of I.R.C. §§ 408(a)(6), (b)(3).
The revenue procedure also modifies the procedures for
opinion letters issued to sponsoring organizations. R e v .
Proc. 92-38, I.R.B. 1992-20, 23.
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT.  The taxpayer
operated grocery stores and claimed investment tax credit for
central heating, ventilation and cooling systems.  The
taxpayer argued that the machinery was eligible, under
Treas. Reg. § 1.48(e)(2), because the machinery was
necessary for the the sole purpose of temperature and
humidity requirements for refrigeration cases in the stors.
The court held that the taxpayer failed to demonstrate that
the sole justification for the machinery was for the
refrigeration cases. Publix Supermarkets, Inc. v .
U.S., 92-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,240 ( C l s .
Ct. 1992).
After failing for two years to sell real property which
included investment tax credit property, the partnership
contributed the property to another partnership in exchange
for a 25 percent interest in that partnership.  An insurance
company contributed cash in exchange for the remaining
partnership interest.  Some of that cash was distributed to
the original partnership to equalize the partners' interests in
the new partnership.  The court held that the investment tax
credit was recaptured because the contribution of the
property to the partnership was a sale to the insurance
company and not a mere change in the form of doing
business.  Jacobson v. Comm'r, 92-1 U.S. Tax
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Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50236 (8th Cir. 1992), aff'g, 9 6
T.C. 577 (1991).
The taxpayer operated a mushroom growing facility and
claimed investment tax credit for a compost wharf,
pasteurization unit and grow unit.  The court held that the
equipment was eligible for investment tax credit except that
only 5 percent of the grow unit was eligible because only 5
percent of the unit was used in the business in the first year
the unit was placed in service.  In addition, legal and
accounting expenses were not allowed as current deductions,
but required to be capitalized, where the taxpayer failed to
provide evidence separating start-up costs from current
operational costs.  Oregon Trail Mushroom Co. v .
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1992-293.
LEVY.  The IRS has issued proposed regulations
increasing the amount of some exemptions and adding
property to the list of exemptions from levy as required by
TAMRA 1988. 57 Fed. Reg. 22189 (May 2 7 ,
1992) .
PARTNERSHIPS
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. The tax matters
partner filed for personal bankruptcy and the partnership
ended the partner's designation as tax matters partner.  The
IRS sent a final partnership administrative adjustment to the
partner after the termination of the partner's status as TMP
and sent the FPAA to the notice partners after the statute of
limitations on assessments had run.  The IRS agreed with
the partnership that the mailing of the FPAA to the former
TMP was ineffective to toll the statute of limitation on
assessment. The court held that the statute of limitations
was an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional question
and allowed summary judgment for the partnership.
Columbia Building, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 98 T . C .
No. 40 (1992).
S CORPORATIONS
CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS. The taxpayer was a
partner with three of the taxpayer's brothers, all of whom
had almost unlimited authority to withdraw funds from the
partnership. The taxpayer made excessively large
withdrawals and the IRS characterized much of the
withdrawals as constructive dividends, but the taxpayer
argued that the withdrawals were loans.  The court held that
the withdrawals were constructive dividends because no loan
documents were made and no interest was charged until after
an IRS audit. Crowley v. Comm'r, 92-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,235 (1st Cir. 1992), aff'g,
T.C. Memo. 1990-636.
ONE CLASS OF STOCK.  The IRS has adopted as
final regulations governing the one class of stock
requirement under I.R.C. § 1361.  The final regulations
generally follow the proposed regulations, see 2 ALD p.
150; however, the final regulations change the second
condition under which an obligation is not treated as a
second class of stock-- where "a principal purpose of the
obligation is to circumvent the rights conferred by the
corporation's outstanding stock or to circumvent the
limitation on eligible shareholders." 57 Fed. R e g .
22646 (May 29, 1992).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
COMBINE.  The plaintiff injured a foot while
attempting to clear the grain discharge auger on a combine
manufactured by the defendant.  The plaintiff asserted that
the defendant was liable because of a failure to adequately
warn about the danger of clearing the auger while in the
discharge tank.  The manufacturer argued that it was not
liable for failure to warn where the plaintiff was shown to
be aware of the danger and knowingly assumed the risks of
cleaning the auger while in the discharge tank.  The jury had
found the plaintiff 41 percent negligent and the manufacturer
59 percent negligent.  The court held that under the statutory
doctrine of comparative negligence, the assumption of risk
defense was not an absolute bar to recovery and the parties'
relative negligence was an issue for the jury.  The court
upheld the jury verdict as supported by the evidence of
negligence by both parties. Watson v. Navistar
Intern. Transp. Corp., 827 P.2d 656 (Idaho
1992) .
TARPAULIN.  The defendant purchased from the
plaintiff a tarpaulin for covering a temporary storage of
grain.  The delivered tarpaulin arrived late and was smaller
than ordered, causing some grain to be unprotected.  In a
suit by the plaintiff for the purchase price, the defendant
counterclaimed for the value of the unprotected grain which
spoiled.  The trial court awarded the defendant the return of
the downpayment and ordered the return of the tarpaulin,
holding that a liability limitation clause in the sales contract
prevented the defendant from recovering consequential
damages.  The defendant argued that the limitation clause
was unenforceable because it was overbroad, vague and
inconspicuous.  The court held that the element of
conspicuousness was not appropriate for an action not
involving breach of warranty and that the limitation clause
was not overbroad or vague because it referred only to
liability involving the grain. Rayner Covering v .
Danvers Farmers Elevator, 589 N.E.2d 1 0 3 4
(Ill. Ct. App. 1992).
RIPARIAN RIGHTS
JURISDICTION.  The plaintiff challenged a 1987
Water Court decree granting the defendants in-stream flow
rights.  The plaintiff argued that the Water Court did not
have jurisdiction to grant the in-stream rights to a private
party.  The appellate court held that an erroneous decision
by the Water Court did not affect the subject matter
jurisdiction of the Water Court over in-stream flow rights.
Because the Water Court had jurisdiction, the plaintiff was
barred from challenging the decree by the statute of
limitations.  The court also held that the published resume
notice of the application for the in-stream water rights was
sufficient notice to the plaintiff of the original application
to bar the plaintiff's challenge. Board of County







TIMBER.  The plaintiff sold timber land to a third
party under an installment contract which required written
permission of the plaintiff for any timber cutting or
removal during the contract.  While the third party was
current on the payments and in possession of the property,
the third party hired the defendant to cut and remove timber
to clear land for a house.  The court held that under Ga.
Code § 51-12-51, the plaintiff held sufficient interest in the
title to the land to bring the action for recovery of the value
of the timber removed, but a material issue of fact remained
as to whether the plaintiff had complied with the statute as
to filing the plaintiff's interest in the land in the county
where the land was located. Southern Land & Cattle
Co. v. Simmons, 415 S.E.2d 329 (Ga. Ct. App.
1992) .
ZONING
AGRICULTURAL USE .  The county Land Use
Board of Appeals (LUBA) granted an owner of land zoned as
exclusive farm use land the right to construct a second
residence on the property for a son and daughter-in-law.  The
LUBA allowed the construction because the owner was a
farm operator, but the LUBA did not rule on the issue of
whether the relatives' residence on the farm was necessary
for the owner's assistance in operating the farm.  Most of
the farm was leased to third parties, leaving only a nine acre
pasture which was used to pasture a horse.  The court
remanded the case back to the LUBA  and held that the
LUBA was required to rule on both issues in order to grant
the application to build the second residence under Or. Rev.
Stat. § 215.283. Kenagy v. Benton County, 8 2 6
P.2d 1047 (Or. Ct. App. 1992).
CITATION UPDATES
Weiser v. U.S., 959 F.2d 146 (9th Cir .
1992), aff'g, 746 F.Supp. 958 (N.D. Cal i f .
1990) (alternative minimum tax) see p. 69 supra.
In re Brazier Forest Products, Inc., 138 B . R .
265 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1991)  (capital gains for
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